Italian Military History

Italy's military history spans some 3000 years, from Etruscan and Samnite warriors, to Roman legions, to medieval knights and crusaders, to the condottieri of the Renaissance, to the Arditi shock troops of World War I, the commando frogmen and Folgore paratroopers of World War II, and other elite military units such as the Alpini, Bersaglieri and Carabinieri. This site offers photos, images and historical information pertaining to Italian military history throughout the past 30 centuries.

Thursday, August 30, 2018

General Umberto Nobile (1885-1978)

General Umberto Nobile

General Umberto Nobile (1885-1978) was an Italian aviator, aeronautical engineer and Arctic explorer who developed and promoted semi-rigid airships during the period between the two World Wars. He is best known as commander of the famous 1926 flight around the North Pole in the airship Norge, piloting the first aircraft to ever reach the North Pole and the first to fly across the polar ice cap from Europe to America.

A popular hero in Fascist Italy, in the 1930's Nobile defected to the Soviet Union, helping to develop the Soviet semi-rigid airship programme, which strongly hurt his reputation in Italy and Europe. Despite this, he was allowed to return to Italy to teach in December 1936, before going to the United States in 1939 to teach aeronautics at Lewis University in Romeoville, Illinois.

After World War II he was reinstated and promoted to lieutenant general of the Italian Air Force, but his involvement in Communist politics helped solidify his negative reputation among many western historians.

Friday, August 24, 2018

Caserma Ermanno Carlotto: Italian Military Barracks in Tientsin, China

Italian soldier posted outside Caserma Ermanno Carlotto in Tientsin, China, 1939.

Caserma Ermanno Carlotto was the main military building of the Italian Armed Forces in Tientsin, China. The barracks was built in 1926, during the period when Tientsin was a concession belonging to the Kingdom of Italy (1901-1947). It was named in honour of Ermanno Carlotto, an Italian soldier who fell during the Boxer Rebellion, and who was posthumously awarded the Gold Medal for Military Valour. Today it is still in use and houses a division of the Chinese paramilitary police.

Tuesday, August 21, 2018

Monday, August 20, 2018

Italian Weapons of World War II: Lanciafiamme Spalleggiato Modello 1935

Italian soldiers carrying the Lanciafiamme Spalleggiato Modello 1935

The Lanciafiamme Spalleggiato Modello 1935, also known as Model 35, was a flamethrower issued to the Royal Italian Army during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. Units with these weapons were assigned to a "Flamethrower Platoon".

In 1939, 176 of these were sold to the Finnish Army, who used them against the Red Army during the Winter War. During the Second World War, the Model 35 was issued to a division on the Greek-Albanian front in 1940 before being replaced with the newer Model 40.

Sunday, August 19, 2018

The Wal-Wal Incident of 1934: Origin of the Second Italo-Abyssinian War


(Extracted from “Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini” by Luigi Villari.)

After the first World War Great Britain had begun to show signs of attempting political and economic penetration into Ethiopia. One British newspaper started a campaign to demand international action, or possibly British action alone, against Ethiopia to repress slavery which was rampant throughout the country, and it suggested that a mandate be conferred on Great Britain for the purpose. This would have meant a British protectorate, and it was for this reason that in 1923 Italy very imprudently supported Ethiopia's application for admission to the League of Nations. The application encountered opposition in many quarters, but it was eventually granted on the condition that Ethiopia should abolish slavery and respect all international engagements on the control of the arms traffic. It is needless to say that Ethiopia carried out neither of these undertakings. . . .

On August 2, 1928, Italy concluded a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia for the duration of 20 years, whereby the two governments undertook to promote reciprocal trade. It was completed by a convention for the construction of a motor road between Dessieh in Ethiopia and the Italian Eritrean port of Assab.

The frontiers between the other Italian colony of Somaliland and Ethiopia had never been delimited. An agreement had been signed on May 16, 1908, which stipulated that “all the territory belonging to the tribes toward the coast will remain under Italian rule, and all the Ogaden territory and that of the tribes toward Ogaden will remain under Ethiopia.”

The two governments undertook (Art. 5) to delimit the frontiers, but the work did not begin until December, 1910; and even then the Ethiopian delegates placed every obstacle in the way of the Italians, so that the delimitation was never completed. At this time the question was not important, for Italian Somaliland was not yet fully organized. But, in 1923, the new Governor, Count Cesare De Vecchi, proceeded to occupy the whole territory of the colony. He established a line of small military posts along the presumptive frontier to give security to the tribes under Italian protection against the frequent incursions of Ethiopian raiders, whose object was to carry off natives and enslave them.

These posts also served to protect the springs used by all the inhabitants of the area, whether they were Italian or Ethiopian subjects, to water their flocks and herds in that very dry country. One of the posts in question was Wal-Wal, around which some small forts had been erected. The raids [by Ethiopians] continued because the internal conditions of Ethiopia were chaotic, not only along the Somaliland border but also along that of Eritrea. At the same time in spite of the provisions of the 1928 treaty every obstacle was raised against the activities of Italian traders and business men in Ethiopia, and the building of the Ethiopian sector of the Dessieh-Assab road was held up.

In November, 1934, large Ethiopian forces suddenly approached the Italian frontier post at Wal-Wal—an area which had been under Italian rule for many years and to which Ethiopia had never made any claims at all. About that time, an Anglo-Ethiopian commission had been engaged in delimiting the frontier between Ethiopia and British Somaliland; and on November 23rd it, too, appeared before Wal-Wal, with an escort of 80 men of the British Somaliland Camel Corps and another much larger force of Ethiopian warriors. The British and the Ethiopian commissioners sent a joint protest to the commander of the Italian frontier area, because they were not allowed to circulate freely “in Ethiopia, in the Wal-Wal area.”

A conversation took place between the Italian commander, Captain Roberto Cimmaruta, and the British Commissioner, Lieut.-Colonel Clifford. Cimmaruta protested because the Ethiopian force was commanded by Samantar, a notorious bandit and criminal. The Ethiopians were now strengthened by fresh bands until they were five times as numerous as the Italian force of native troops at Wal-Wal. Colonel Clifford obviously encouraged the aggressive attitude of the Ethiopians, assuring their commander that the territory belonged by right to Ethiopia and giving him to understand that the claims of Ethiopia were supported by the British Government. Addis Ababa was thus led to count on Great Britain; the Negus and his advisers evidently were unfamiliar with the history of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute in 1864. Clifford, himself, however, now withdrew to Ado, so as to avoid direct responsibility for himself, while leaving his protégés to do what they wished.

On the night of December 4, 1934, the Ethiopians attacked Wal-Wal, but were beaten off after heavy fighting. As the Italians were only one-fifth as numerous as the Ethiopians, it is hardly likely that they would have been the first to attack, as the Addis Ababa Government asserted. Moreover, the only advantage which the Italians had over the Ethiopians was the possession of a couple of aeroplanes, but the attack took place at nightfall when the planes would have been of very little use. Cimmaruta, himself, not expecting the attack at that point, had moved to another post, and the native soldiers, with no Italian officer at Wal-Wal, would certainly not have taken any such initiative.

Protracted negotiations now took place at Addis Ababa, the Italian Government demanding satisfaction for the outrage and compensation for the families of the native soldiers killed in the attack. After various exchanges of notes, it was agreed that the matter should be referred to a committee of arbitration and conciliation.

In the meantime, behind the Italo-Ethiopian dispute British-Italian friction began to loom on the horizon. At first, it seemed limited to the activities of various official, semi-official and unspecified British representatives in Ethiopia, but it soon extended to the Government itself. The Cabinet was beginning to be eager, for electioneering reasons, to secure the support of the League of Nations Union. . . .

Further frontier incidents occurred in East Africa, and many raids by irregular and even regular Ethiopian forces were made on Italian colonial territory.

The Wal-Wal incident was submitted in May to the League Council, where it was finally decided that the Arbitration Committee should meet in June, first in Milan and then at Scheveningen, Holland. . . .

Ethiopia now began to concentrate ever larger forces on the frontiers of the two Italian colonies and to import quantities of war material, purchased or received gratis [free] from foreign countries. Until February, 1935 (nearly three months after Wal-Wal) the Italian East African colonies had been left almost defenseless save for small native garrisons with a few Italian officers and N.C.O.'s, whereas Ethiopia brought forward a large and well-armed standing army. It was then that Italy began to think of reinforcing its African garrisons with home troops, which required a week's voyage to reach Eritrea and a fortnight to reach Somaliland.

Thursday, August 16, 2018

The Sigonella Crisis of 1985: When Italy and the United States Almost Went to War

Italian Forces standoff with U.S. Special Forces on the night of October 10-11, 1985

We surrounded the plane, and then the Italians surrounded us.”
(New York Times, October 19, 1985)


The Achille Lauro Hijacking

On October 7, 1985 the Italian MS Achille Lauro cruise ship was hijacked by four heavily armed men of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) off the coast of Egypt, as she was sailing from Alexandria to Ashdod, Israel. Some 80 passengers and 320 crewmembers were taken hostage, most of them Italians. There was only one casualty: the death of an elderly wheelchair-bound Jewish-American man named Leon Klinghoffer, an American citizen.

While negotations were being made with the PLF, the Italian Special Forces were planning to intervene and board the ship. The mission was to be led by 60 Italian special force troops from the 9th Paratroopers Assault Regiment “Col Moschin”, following a plan devised with COMSUBIN—Italy's elite commando frogman force.

During the preparations, the U.S. ambassador to Italy informed Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi that the United States also intended to mount a military assault on the vessel. Craxi protested, saying that it was an Italian ship and therefore only Italy should act. At this point Klinghoffer's death had not yet been confirmed, nor was his identity yet known.

While the Italian and Egyptian governments were leading successful negotiations with the PLF, President Ronald Raegan proceeded to implement a plan for military intervention, despite Craxi's protests. These plans proved unnecessary, however, and were not carried out, as on October 9 at 5:00 p.m. the four hijackers released the hostages, abandoned the ship and surrendered themselves to the Egyptian authorities in exchange for safe passage.

The ship's captain, Capt. Gerardo De Rosa, confirmed in a call with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti that he had regained control of the ship, and also informed the Minister of Klinghoffer's death.

The next day, October 10, the four hijackers together with several Egyptian representatives boarded an EgyptAir Boeing 737 airliner. Also on board was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) who had condemned the hijacking and helped the Egyptians negotiate the release of the hostages. The jet took off from Cairo at 4:15 p.m. EST and headed for Tunisia.


Jurisdiction Dispute Between Italy and the United States

Italy maintained that the ship, being Italian, was legally Italian territory and therefore the hijackers should be extradited to Italy. However, the United States insisted that the death of an American citizen justified their extradition to the United States.

The Reagan administration ordered the EgyptAir jet to be intercepted and forced to land so that the hijackers could be taken into U.S. custody.

On the night of October 10, on the orders of President Reagan and his Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, four F-14 fighters intercepted the aircraft and forced it to land in Sicily, at the Sigonella air base—a base which was shared by the United States Navy and Italian Air Force, but where the United States had no jurisdiction.

When Italian Colonel Ercolano Annichiarico learned of the American action, at about 10:30 p.m., he denied the American request to land at Sigonella. They landed anyway.

Not only had the Americans not received consent from the Italians to forcibly land a non-hostile plane flying in compliance with international law at Sigonella, but the American military action was taken solely for American purposes—not those of the NATO alliance—and was taken in order to secure criminals. This was in violation of the purely joint military purposes that the Italians had agreed to when deciding to share the utilization of the base.

Minutes after landing, American forces declared that the EgyptAir jet was now in the custody of U.S. military. The Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, was strongly opposed to American intervention. The Egyptian government also protested the American interception of its plane, which was a lawful flight under international law, and therefore, according to international law, the American interception of the plane constituted an illegal hijacking and act of terrorism.


Standoff Between the Italians and Americans

American troops of the Delta Force, led by General Carl Stiner, and SEAL Team SIX, under commanding officer Robert A. Gormly, had encircled the Egyptian airplane, but soon found themselves surrounded by Italian military security from the Italian Air Force and Carabinieri—the Italian military police. They insisted that Italy had territorial rights over the base and jurisdiction over the hijackers. The standoff between the United States and Italian armed forces began.

20 Carabinieri and 30 troops of the VAM—an elite branch of the Italian Air Force—contested for control of the plane with 80 armed operatives of the U.S. Delta Force and SEAL Team Six. The Italian forces were soon reinforced by 300 additional armed Carabinieri who had also blocked off the runway with their trucks. The Italian military refused to allow the SEALs to board the plane, threatening to open fire on the Americans if they made any attempt to do so.

Italian Military Forces surround U.S. Special Forces at Sigonella Air Field, 1985

Stiner and Gormly contacted the Pentagon to inform them of the situation, and this information was passed onto the Reagan Administration. Members of the President's staff told the Italian government that the U.S. special forces team intended to arrest the hijackers. The Italians dismissed the Americans' claim of a right to do so, maintaining that the matter fell within Italian jurisdiction due to the ship sailing under an Italian flag.

A phone call took place between President Reagan and Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. Reagan informed Craxi that the U.S. would seek extradition of the terrorists to face charges in U.S. courts. Craxi refused to back down and reasserted Italian territorial rights over the Sigonella air base.

Italian President Francesco Cossiga ordered Italian troops to use lethal force if necessary to block the Americans if they tried to leave with the prisoners. The American forces were outnumbered 350 to 80, although Gen. Stiner boastfully asserted that his men had enough firepower to defeat the Italian forces. However, the American leadership in Washington concluded that Stiner's men would never be able to successfully make it out of Italy with the hijackers.

The stand-off lasted throughout the night. After five hours of negotiations between the Italian and American governments, the U.S. yielded and conceded the Italian claim of jurisdiction. At 4:00 a.m. CET the next day, Stiner and his men were ordered to stand down.

After continued talks between Italy and Egypt the four hijackers were arrested by the Italian Carabinieri at Sigonella, and taken to the air base jail, then transferred to a local prison. They would eventually be tried and convicted in July of the following year.

In the meantime, the EgyptAir jet—carrying the Egyptian representatives and Abu Abbas—was cleared by the Italians to fly to Rome.


Jet Fighter Showdown Between the Italians and Americans

When Gen. Stiner learned that the Egyptian jet had been cleared by the Italians, he took it upon himself to board a T-39 Navy executive jet with American Special Operations personnel and planned to shadow the jet to make sure it landed in Rome rather than return to Cairo. When the Egyptian airliner took off from Sigonella at 10:00 p.m. the American T-39 was not granted clearance from that runway. In response, the Americans illegally used a nearby runway without receiving Italian permission to do so.

In response to this unauthorized act by Stiner and the Americans, the Italians sent in two Aeritalia F-104S Starfighter warplanes of the 36th Stormo from Gioia del Colle. These were soon joined by two more Italian F-104s from the Grazzanise air base.

In response to the Italian action, other American warplanes came up behind the Italian jets. The Italian jets also found that their radar had been sabotaged above the Tyrrhenian Sea by a U.S. Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler.

The pilots aboard the Italian and U.S. jets proceeded to exchange insults over the radio in a high-tension atmosphere bordering upon war.

Once the Egyptian aircraft approached Rome, all of the American jets turned back except the T-39 with Gen. Stiner, which continued to tail the plane. The Italian air-traffic controllers in Rome denied the T-39 permission to land, but the U.S. pilot falsely claimed there was an “in-flight emergency” which gave him an automatic right to land the jet, further infuriating the Italian authorities.


The Abu Abbas Question

The question of what should happen to Abu Abbas led to further disputes. Israeli intelligence asserted that Abu Abbas was the mastermind of the hijacking and not an innocent party. The Mossad—Israel's secret intelligence agency—and the United States secretly collaborated together to compile evidence for a case against Abbas, to pressure Italy into handing him over to the Americans.

The U.S. District Court in Washington, DC then issued warrants for Abbas and the hijackers, which were delivered to the Italian Ministry of Justice by the U.S. Ambassador to Italy on October 12 at 5:30 a.m.

Italy's Ministry of Justice determined that the United States' claims had no legal basis, and Prime Minister Craxi announced that Italy would not be complying with U.S. requests for extradition. The Reagan administration was shocked by Italy's decision. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy interrupted a meeting between Craxi and his cabinet with a personal plea from Reagan.

After consideration, Craxi and his cabinet voted to permit Abbas to depart from Italy and refused to hand him over to the Americans on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to link Abbas to the hijacking.

Abraham Sofaer, a U.S. State Department legal adviser, publicly condemned Italy's decision.


Aftermath

The standoff at Sigonella and subsequent jet fighter showdown—collectively known as the Sigonella Crisis—was the most serious post-war diplomatic crisis between Italy and the United States. It marked the height of tensions between the Italian and American governments during the Cold War period and nearly led to the first open war between Italy and the United States since the end of World War II.

The United States' intervention and subsequent diplomatic pressures were widely regarded in Italy as acts of American arrogance, and Craxi's refusal to back down was popularly received. Moreover, the American violation of operating in Italian airspace and landing in a Roman airport without overflight or landing permissions was seen by the Italians as an affront to their laws and safety regulations, and it negatively influenced diplomatic relations between the two countries for some time.

The episode is still remembered with pride by Italians today, who view Craxi's handling of the Sigonella Crisis and the Abu Abbas Question as a defense of Italian rights and sovereignty, an exertion of independent foreign policy, and as a bold act of resistance and defiance against American pressures and bullying.

Tuesday, August 14, 2018

Lucius Papirius Cursor


"A soldier must rely on his sword and his courage, and not waste time adorning himself with gold and silver. ... A soldier must adorn himself with his valour."
Lucius Papirius Cursor 
(Livius, The History of Rome, Book IX, 40)
Lucius Papirius Cursor was a 4th century BC Roman general and politician who was Roman consul five times and dictator twice. He was a member of the patrician gens Papiria of ancient Rome. Considered the best general of the Second Samnite War (326 BC - 304 BC), Cursor was noted for his strict discipline, immense bodily strength and undisputed bravery. He was given the cognomen Cursor, meaning "The Runner", because he was able to walk over 50 Roman miles a day in full marching order and demanded the same from his soldiers. According to Livius, in his day no one was able to outrun him. During his consulship he issued the Lex Poetelia-Papiria abolishing debt bondage for Roman citizens. His son of the same name was also a distinguished general; he completed the subjection of Samnium in 272 BC.

Monday, August 13, 2018

Photo: U.S. Soldiers Holding the Italian flag

U.S. Soldiers from the Old Guard holding and guarding the Italian flag await the arrival of Italy's Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Claudio Graziano at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, VA, Jan. 23, 2014.


Saturday, August 11, 2018

Photos of World War II: Bersaglieri Motorcycle Troops

Bersaglieri motorcycle troops in North Africa, c. 1941/1942


Fr. Antonio Intreccialagli (1908-2000)

Fr. Antonio Intreccialagli

Fr. Antonio Intreccialagli (1908-2000) was a Roman Catholic priest and Italian military chaplain during World War II.

Known as the "Legionary of God", Fr. Intreccialagli was a missionary in Lebanon before becoming a military chaplain in 1940. Initially he joined the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Royal Air Force) in Sicily where he participated in numerous rescue operations at sea. Later, on September 21, 1943, he enlisted in the "M" Battalions and fought on the front with the Tagliamento Legion until 1945.

After the war he returned to missionary activity in France, Turkey and Iraq before retiring to the convent of San Silvestro di Montecompatri, near Rome, where he died on January 7, 2000.

Saturday, August 4, 2018

The Venetian Arsenal

View of the entrance to the Venetian Arsenal, by Canaletto, oil on canvas, c. 1732

The Venetian Arsenal is a complex of former shipyards and armories in the city of Venice. Construction of the Arsenal began around 1104, during the reign of Doge Ordelafo Faliero. It was one of the earliest large-scale industrial enterprises in history and became the largest industrial complex in Europe before the Industrial Revolution, spanning an area of about 45 hectares (110 acres), or about 15% of Venice.

Surrounded by a 2-mile (3.2 km) rampart, laborers and shipbuilders regularly worked within the Arsenal, building ships that sailed from the city's port. With high walls shielding the Arsenal from public view and guards protecting its perimeter, different areas of the Arsenal each produced a particular prefabricated ship part or other maritime implement, such as munitions, rope, and rigging. These parts could then be assembled into a ship in as little as one day. An exclusive forest owned by the Arsenal navy, in the Montello hills area of Veneto, provided the Arsenal's wood supply.

Venice developed methods of mass-producing warships in the Arsenal, including the frame-first system to replace the Roman hull-first practice. This new system was much faster and required less wood. At the peak of its efficiency in the early 16th century, the Arsenal employed some 16,000 people who were able to produce nearly one ship each day, and could fit out, arm, and provision a newly built galley with standardized parts on a production-line basis not seen again until the Industrial Revolution.

The staff of the Arsenal also developed new firearms at an early date, beginning with bombards in the 1370's and numerous small arms for use against the Genoese a few years later. The muzzle velocity of handguns was improved beyond that of the crossbow, creating armor-piercing rounds. Arsenal-produced arms were also noteworthy for their multi-purpose utility; the Venetian condottieri leader, Bartolomeo Colleoni, is usually given credit as being the first to mount the Arsenal's new lighter-weight artillery on mobile carriages for field use.

The Arsenal produced the majority of Venice's maritime trading vessels, which generated much of the city's economic wealth and power, lasting until the fall of the Venetian Republic to Napoleon in 1797. Significant parts of the Arsenal were destroyed under Napoleonic rule, and later rebuilt to enable the Arsenal's present use as a naval base.

Thursday, August 2, 2018

Naval Warfare Between Pisa and Genoa (1284)

Naval Warfare Between Pisa and Genoa (1284), from the Chronicle of Fra' Salimbene de Adam da Parma, 13th century:
In the year of the Lord 1284, the Pisans seeing all the evil inflicted on them by the Genoese and wishing to avenge themselves, built a large number of ships, galleys, and sea vessels on the river Arno, and then enacted a law that everybody between twenty and sixty years of age was required to go to war. And they sailed along the whole of the Genoese coast, destroying, burning, killing, capturing, and pillaging. Moreover, they sailed along the entire coastline from Genoa into Provence by the maritime cities of Noli, Albenga, Savona, and Ventimiglia, seeking out the Genoese. The Genoese, in the meantime, enacted the statute that no one between the age of eighteen and seventy was exempt from war. And so they went to sea, seeking out the Pisans. Finally, the two fleets met between Capo Corso and Gorgona, and they tied their ships together in the usual fashion of a naval battle. And there was such great slaughter on both sides at that place that the heavens appeared to weep in sympathy. Huge numbers were killed on both sides and many ships were sunk. And just as the Pisans appeared to be victorious, a large number of Genoese ships arrived and rushed upon the already exhausted Pisans. And another fierce battle was fought. Finally, seeing themselves overwhelmed, the Pisans surrendered. The Genoese then killed the wounded and imprisoned all the others. Yet neither side can boast of victory, for both sides suffered terribly. And so great was the weeping and crying in both Genoa and Pisa that the like was never heard "from the day of...creation" in either of those cities until the present day. Who without weeping and great sadness can recount or even think about how these two noble cities, from which all Italians have received so much good, have mutually destroyed one another out of pride, ambition, and vainglory because the one sought to conquer the other, as if the sea were not sufficient for the two of them. 
These things took place on a Sunday, August 13, the feast of the holy martyrs Hypolitus and Cassian. I have not recorded the number of killed and captured because the reports are so various. Yet the bishop of Pisa specified a number in a letter to the bishop of Bologna, his brother. I have not given this number either, because I am awaiting word from the Friars Minor of Genoa and Pisa who will give a more accurate number. And take note that this battle and this slaughter was forecast long before it took place. For in the village of San Ruffino in the bishopric of Parma, some women who were washing flax by night saw two large stars fighting with one another, and they drew apart many times and came back together in battle.
Also in that year after the battle between the Pisans and the Genoans, many Pisan women - beautiful, noble, rich, and powerful ladies - went in groups of thirty and forty, walking on foot from Pisa to Genoa in order to inquire about and to visit the captives. For one had a husband there, another a son, brother, or other relative, men whom God: "gave unto mercies, in the sight of all those that had made them captives." And when they asked the jailers about the captives, they were told, "Yesterday thirty men died and today forty, and we threw them in the sea. It is the same every day with the Pisans." And when these ladies heard such things about their loved ones, and when they could not find them there, they fell prostrate out of their great fear and distress, and from pure anxiety and pain of heart they could scarcely breathe. Then on reviving they clawed their faces with their nails and tore their hair. And they wept aloud with great lamentation and "wept till they had no more tears". Then the Scripture in I Machabees was fulfilled: "The beauty of the women was changed. Every bridegroom took up lamentation: and the bride that sat in the marriage bed, mourned." For needy and poor and hungry and wretched and distressed and sorrowful, the Pisans died in their prisons, because: "They that hated them had dominion over them. And their enemies afflicted them: and they were humbled under their hands," and they were not "accounted worthy" to be buried "in the sepulchres of" their "fathers", but were denied burial altogether. Moreover, when these women returned home, they even found those whom they had left safe at home dead.

Photos of World War II: Bersaglieri in North Africa

An Italian Bersaglieri ("sharp shooter") dispatch rider on an upgraded Moto Guzzi motorcycle advancing beside an Autoblinda armored car in North Africa during WWII.


Italian Postcard from World War I: "Viva Italia! un sacro patto"

"Viva Italia! un sacro patto. Tutti stringe i figli suoi. Esso alfin di tanti ha fatto. Un sol popolo d'Eroi..."